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REVIEWS

ff. N. CASTANEDA, Oblitation and modal logic. LoAU et Mllly1e, n.s. vol. 3 (1960),
pp. 40-48.
Deontic lop:, it is argued, cannot be adequately rormalized as a more part or, or reduced to
a system of, ordinuy modal logic. Anderson's conditions for a normal deontic losic (see
reference in preceding review) are viewed as not sufficient to insure that 'P', 'O', and •p• when
interpreted will have the intended correspondence to the meanings or• permissible,' 'obliptory,'
and ' forbidden.' A counter-example is given to show that some restriction upon the interpretation of the propositional constant• B • is required. Otherwise, from 'There is a blue book which
may have failed to be blue• it is possible by the definitions and interpretations or• S • and • p•
to conclude 'It is forbidden that there is a blue book.•
Three possible interpretations or •s•, declared to be the only ones that will do, arc considered: and grounds for rejecting each, presented. Not considered, however, Is the Interpretation
of •S• as •There is·a violation,' an alternative that does not seem objectionable in the manner of
the rejected three.
A more persuasive case is made against deontic systems in which "COpLOp' is provable (thole
based upon S4 or stron1er systems). That true statements formulatina obliptions are all loak:ally
true is viewed by the author as absurd.
It is ar,ued that the ' D (•p:, S):, Op' part, i.e., 'Pp:, ◊(p & •S)', of Anderson's
• OM7. Op • 0( - p :> S) • is false in the deonti<; interpretation proposed, but then what
purporU to be a counter-example or 'O(p & •S):, Pp' is presented. The proposed counterexample errs in interpretin1 •s• as a sinale particular sanction, rather than u Anderson's disjunction or all sanctions.
Anderson's deontie S)'$lems arc characd with committing Mooro's "naturalistic fallacy" iD
tho sense or confusina aoodness with a non-ethical property, aood in the teDJe of ouaht (to
exist).
Finally, It is allepd to be error to prefix deontic operators to descriptions of states or affain;
but aside from merely asserting lhat lhese must be prefixed to descriptions of acts, no reasons
are pvcn wby the Anderson approach is unacceptable.
The Issues raised about (I) restrictions upon the interpretation of' B • and (2) the provability
or 'COpLOp' seem to the reviewer to require either some further Ollplanation or some rcfioo.
ment or the proposed deontlc systems or their interpretation.
Misprint: pap 44, line 38, for •p:, S', read '•P:, S'.
LAYMAN E. ALUM

